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By Arthur H. Travers, Jr.*

Prior Consistent Statements
I.

INTRODUCTION

At least two groups of readers are indebted to Professor David
Dow for his article KLM v. Tuller: A New Approach to Admissibility ofPriorStatements of A Witness.1 The first group is comprised
of teachers of evidence who have used his analysis in constructing
their class presentation of KLM v. Tuller.2 The second group is
comprised of those who write about the law of evidence. For them
Professor Dow has provided an excellent example of a writing
form that is all too often overlooked-the extended commentary
upon a particular case of more than routine interest to specialists.
Such a commentary attempts neither an encyclopedic survey of all
the cases in the area, nor an education of a reader with only a passing interest in the subject. It seems appropriate, in a symposium
honoring Professor Dow, to return to the problem that was the subject of his article and to do so in the form which that article so well
exemplifies--even if one invites invidious comparisons thereby.
The case chosen for such a commentary is United States v.
Iaconetti.3 The issue to examine is the impact of the Federal
Rules of Evidence upon the admissibility of prior statements of a
witness which are consistent with his or her trial testimony. Generally, it may be said that the unanimous common law view of the
courts was that such statements could not be received as evidence
of the facts asserted in them because admission for such a purpose
would violate the hearsay rule.4 If, however, the statements were
received only to prove that they had been made, they would not be
considered hearsay.
In theory, then, there was only one question to occupy the
courts' attention: Under what circumstances would the making of a
prior consistent statement by a witness be of sufficient probative
value to warrant incurring the risks involved in admitting it? Essentially this was an issue of relevancy, although the hearsay rule

1.

2.
3.
4.

Professor of Law, University of Colorado. BA. 1957, Grinnell College; LLB.
1962, Harvard.
41 NEB. L REV. 598 (1962).
292 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
406 F. Supp. 554 (E.D.N.Y.), affd, 540 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1976).
4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1132 (Chadbourn rev. 1972).
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often became intertwined with it.5 A considerable body of doctrine-which has been called "perplexing" 6-- evolved to answer
this seemingly simple question. Not only were there differences
of view among the states, but aspects of the law within a particular
jurisdiction might be doubtful. For example, while it seems to
have been agreed that such statements were not admissible until
the credibility of the witness had been attacked, courts differed
about what sorts of attack would open the door to this sort of corroboration.
Professor Edmund Morgan and the others responsible for draftig the American Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence eliminated the hearsay objection to the admission of declarations of any
7
person who was "present and subject to cross-examination," thus
agreed.
had
the
courts
on
which
few
rules
one
of
the
overturning
Under the Model Code the trial judge retained, however, his traditional power to exclude evidence if its probative value was outweighed by certain risks such as consuming unwarranted time,
confusing the issues, or misleading or prejudicing the jury.8 To
the extent, therefore, that common law rules of exclusion and admission involved only matters of relevancy, the Model Code would
not necessarily have changed the law. An approach similar to that
of the Model Code was taken a decade later by9the drafters of the
first version of the Uniform Rules of Evidence.
At first glance the Federal Rules of Evidence appear to essay a
far less sweeping change in the judicial doctrine that prior consistent statements could not be received as substantive evidence.
Rule 802 continues the rule excluding hearsay in the absence of an
exception recognized by the Rules.'0 Rule 801(c) contains a fairly
conventional definition of hearsay: "'Hearsay' is a statement,
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial
or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Finally, Rule 801(d) exempts, by legislative definition,
some-but only some-prior statements by a witness:
A statement is not hearsay if
[t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to
(1) ...
cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent with his testimony, and was given under oath subject to the
5. See Thomas, Rehabilitating the Impeached Witness with Consistent
Statements, 32 Mo. L. REV. 472, 473 (1967).
6. Annot., 140 AJL.R. 21, 23 (1942).

7. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 503(b) (1942).
8. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 303 (1942).

9. UNIFORM RuLEs OF EVIDENCE 45, 63(1) (1953).
10. FED. R. Evm. 802: "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these
rules or rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of Congress."
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penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition, or (B) consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper
influence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a person made after
perceiving him .... 11

Under the Federal Rules, as at common law or under the Model
Code, there would be no hearsay problem if the prior statement
were merely offered to show that it had, in fact, been made. In

such a case, the statement would simply not be "hearsay" under
the definition of Rule 801(c). Of course, the statement would have
to be "relevant" under the definition of Rule 40112 and of sufficient
probative value to be admissible under Rule 403,13 just as it had to
be of sufficient probative worth at common law.
Moreover, the Federal Rules, like the common law and the earlier efforts at codification, admit as substantive evidence prior consistent statements of a witness that fit one or more exceptions to
the hearsay rule, 14 but the statements are not admissible by virtue
11. The draft of the Rules published in 1969 recognized a fourth class of prior
statements as exempt from the hearsay rule: "a transcript of testimony given
under oath at a trial or hearing or before a grand jury." Proposed Rules of
Evidence, Rule 8-01(c), 46 F.R.D. 161, 331 (1969) (Mar. 1969 Draft). This
would have made such testimony admissible if consistent with the witness'
trial testimony for non-rebuttal purposes and thus broadened the class of
prior consistent statements admissible as substantive evidence. This provision was deleted in the 1971 Proposed Draft. See 51 F.R.D. 315, 413 (1971).
12. Evidence which is not "relevant" as that term is defined in FED.R. EvD. 401
is excluded by FED. R. EvID.402. Evidence which is "relevant" is admissible
unless some other rule excludes it. Rule 401 provides: "'Relevant evidence'
means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is
of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."
13. FED. R. EvID.403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence."
14. Of course, this would not be the case for those exceptions that require a
showing of the declarant's unavailability, but most exceptions do not. Thus,
for example, in a personal injury case, the plaintiffs statements about his
physical condition to his doctor may be admitted as statements of physical
condition by FED. R. Evrn. 803(3), or as statements made for the purposes of
obtaining medical diagnosis or treatment by FED. R. Evm. 803(4), even
though they duplicate his on-stand testimony-subject to passing the tests of
relevancy. An especially interesting exception is that for recorded recollection. Under the Federal Rules this exception would not be available unless
the witness has "insufficient recollection to enable him to testify fully and
accurately." See FED. R. EvD. 803(5). If the degree of impairment of memory required is substantial, there would be no on-stand testimony with which
the memorandum could be consistent. However, it is possible that the Rule
might make the statement admissible-at least so far as the hearsay rule is
concemed-if a very slight impairment is shown. In such a situation, much
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of their being prior statements of a witness; rather it is believed
that the circumstances of their making provide some guarantee of
trustworthiness.
Most importantly, Rule 801(d) (1) (B) appears to remove the bar
of the hearsay rule for some, but by no means all, prior consistent
statements of a witness, and in this respect the rule seems midway
between the Model Code and the common law. The use of prior
consistent statements to corroborate a witness who was attacked
as having recently fabricated the story told at trial or as being improperly influenced or motivated was one situation in which the
probative value of the statements was widely recognized at common law. Although such statements are admitted as substantive
evidence under Rule 801(d) (1) (B), they were not so admitted at
common law,15 and the party against whom the statement was to
be used was entitled to a limiting instruction.
There was, however, respectable authority for admitting prior
consistent statements in other situations. 16 Under the Rules, it
would appear that if the statements are offered for some purpose
other than to corroborate a witness impeached on the grounds
specified, Rule 801(d) (1) (B) does not operate to remove the statements from the definition of "hearsay" in Rule 801(c). Hence,
Rule 802 would exclude them as substantive evidence, absent
some exception.. 7 Such statements appear to be admissible only
as proof that they were made, just as they were at common law.
Whether the Federal Rules are, in fact, less hospitable to the
widespread use of prior consistent statements as substantive evidence than the Model Code is the focal point of this article. While
of the memorandum would also be a prior consistent statement. This would
similarly be the case in those jurisdictions, like Colorado, that have dispensed with any requirement of impaired memory. See, e.g., Jordan v. People, 151 Colo. 133, 376 P.2d 699 (1962). Again, the statement would have to pass
a relevancy objection if it were to duplicate on-stand testimony.
15. See note 4 & accompanying text supra.
16. Apparently, Maryland and North Carolina would admit the statements irre.g., McAleer v. Horsey, 35 Md.
spective of the nature of the impeachment.
439 (1872);, State v. Dawson, 228 N.C. 85, 44 S.E.2d 527 (1947). Other jurisdictions, while not going so far, would admit the statements in certain defined
cases. For example, if the witness had been impeached by evidence of a prior
inconsistent statement, the matter was quite complex. Some courts would
apparently then receive prior consistent statements. See, e.g., Coates v. People, 106 Colo. 483, 106 P.2d 354 (1940); State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198, 310 P.2d
388 (1957). If the witness denied ever making the prior inconsistent statement, prior consistent statements might be admitted as bearing on that question, even though they would be excluded if the witness acknowledged
making the prior inconsistent statement and thus removed that issue from
the case. The leading case on this point is Stewart v. People, 23 Mich. 63
(1871) (Cooley, J.).
17. FD. I Evm. 802.
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the number of cases construing the Federal Rules of Evidence applicable to prior consistent statements of a witness is as yet too
small to make confident predictions about the future course of the
law possible, there are signs--of which the Iaconetti case is
merely the most dramatic-that the Federal Rules may have
achieved a more far-reaching effect than first appears. 18 Indeed,
the Federal Rules, by a more complicated and circuitous route,
may have reached the same result as the Model Code.
11.

THE IACONETTI CASE

Iaconetti was a federal government-contract inspector. The
prosecution contended that during a meeting on February 10, 1975,
Iaconetti had told a man named Lioi, whose firm was a candidate
for a government contract, that it would be hard to justify a
favorable pre-award survey (which was indispensable to the firm's
being awarded the contract) unless he received one percent of the
contract price, or approximately $12,000. Lioi reported to the FBI
that Iaconetti had made such a proposal and, at the instance of the
FBI agent, conversations between Iaconetti and Lioi occurring on
February 11th and February 24th were taped. 19
Iaconetti initially claimed that he had been joking on February
10th. He later claimed, perhaps somewhat inconsistently, that
Lioi had, without any solicitation, offered him a bribe of $1,000 and
that during the taped conversations on February llth and Febru20
ary 24th he was "leading Lioi on" to gather evidence against him.
The trial thus turned almost entirely upon the resolution of a question of credibility: Was the jury to believe Iaconetti's or Lioi's version of the February 10th conversation?
Iaconetti was convicted and moved for a new trial on the ground
that the court had erroneously admitted as rebuttal evidence the
testimony of Lioi's partner and attorney. Both testified that Lioi
had told them on February 10th that the GSA inspector had asked
him for a bribe. Judge Weinstein held that the testimony was
18. I believe I have read all of the cases decided under the Federal Rules dealing
with the admissibility of prior consistent statements. No case has found reversible error in the admission of the statements. One case found it error to
admit the statement but deemed the error harmless. United States v. Weil,
561 F.2d 1109 (4th Cir. 1977). Two cases, however, refused to reverse a conviction when the trial judge refused to admit the prior consistent statements.
These cases may indicate that the expansive approach adopted in Iaconetti
will not be followed everywhere. Or they may indicate that the trial courts
will be free to chart their own courses. See United States v. Navarro-Varelas,
541 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1976); Gerner v. Vasby, 75 Wis. 2d 660, 250 N.W.2d 319
(1977).
19. 406 F. Supp. 554, 555-56 (E.D.N.Y.), affd, 540 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1976).
20. Id. at 556.
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properly received and denied the motion.2 ' In a carefully organized opinion, Judge Weinstein first assessed the probative value
of the evidence under Federal Rules 401 through 403, reasoning
that Lioi's contacting both his partner and his attorney shortly after the February 10th meeting confirmed the hypothesis that
something important happened at that meeting. It would be imperative to discuss the solicitation of a bribe with his partner and
attorney in order to plan how best to meet what could prove to be a
business crisis. Moreover, the testimony would bolster Lioi's
credibility, making it more likely that Lioi's and not laconetti's version of the February 10th conversation was accurate. 22
Turning next to Rule 403, which empowers the judge to exclude
relevant evidence if its probative value is "substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence, ' 23 Judge
Weinstein found no occasion for excluding the evidence. The jury
had already heard Lioi's version of the February 10th meeting.
"The emotional impact of hearing two brief confirmations of the
solicitation was negligible. Furthermore, since the rebuttal testimony was restricted, by direction of the court, to repetition of defendant's statements to Mr. Lioi, as related by Mr. Lioi to the
witnesses, there was no confusion, delay or waste of time."24
With respect to the hearsay question, it was apparent that the
testimony of Lioi's partner and attorney would be "hearsay" as defined by Rule 801(c), and thus excluded by Rule 802, unless the
qualification on that definition in Rule 801(d) or some exception to
the hearsay rule were applicable. Judge Weinstein believed that
there were three separate provisions in the Rules that authorized
receipt of the statements. 25 First, he argued, Lioi's prior consistent statements could be admitted under Rule 801(d) (1) (B). The
total variance between Lioi's and Iaconetti's accounts of the meeting of February 10th was "sufficient to constitute an implied claim
that Mr. Lioi lied because of improper motive. '2 6 This motive
would be to cover up his own attempt to bribe a government official.
Second, Rule 803 (24) contains an exception to the hearsay rule
for
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 560.
Id. at 556-57.
FED. R. EviD. 403.
406 F. Supp. at 557.
Id.
Id. at 558.
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[a] statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions
but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the
court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is
offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through
reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the
interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into
evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with
a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the statement
particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarand2 the
7
ant.

Judge Weinstein found this exception also to be available. Circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to those of the
named exceptions were provided by Lioi being available for cross
examination and by the proximity of the statements to the alleged
event, thus minimizing the risk of insincerity and faulty memory.
Construing the requirement that the statement be offered to prove
a "material" fact to mean that the fact must not be a trivial one,
Judge Weinstein found this satisfied because of the pivotal importance of the issue of Lioi's credibility. 28 The statements were the
most powerful evidence available in view of the conflict of testimony between Lioi and Iaconetti. To the extent that Iaconetti
claimed to be joking, the statements were evidence of how Lioi understood Iaconetti's statements.
The government concededly gave no notice in advance of trial
of its intention to offer these statements via the exception of Rule
803(24), but ample notice was given midway through Lioi's testimony and five days before his partner and attorney testified in rebuttal. Defense counsel did not request a continuance or make
any reference to his inability to prepare to meet this testimony.
Judge Weinstein declared that under a proper construction of the
rule, "allowance must be made for situations like this in which the
need did not become apparent until after the trial had com'
The shortness of notice was not the prosecution's
menced."2
fault and was not prejudicial.
As a third theory Judge Weinstein argued that Lioi's statements could be received as an admission by Iaconetti under Rule
801(d) (2) (C), which exempts from the definition of hearsay a
statement offered against a party if the statement was "by a person authorized by him to make a statement concerning the subject. '30 Under this theory, by soliciting a bribe, Iaconetti implicitly
27.
28.
29.
30.

FED. R. Evm. 803(24).
406 F. Supp. at 559.
Id. at 560.
Id. at 558 (quoting FED. R. EvD. 801(d) (2) (C)).
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authorized Lioi to discuss the solicitation with his partner and attorney. In affirming Iaconetti's conviction, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit endorsed Judge Weinstein's construction of
Rule 803(24);31 it approved his construction of Rule 801(d) (2) (C)
so far as Lioi's partner's testimony was concerned but not as apthe question
plied to the attorney's testimony 32 and it reserved
33
raised by his construction of Rule 801(d) (1) (B).

An exploration of Judge Weinstein's novel idea about authorized admissions is beyond the scope of this article; his other two
theories regarding the application of the hearsay rule to prior consistent statements, as well as his analysis of the relevancy issues,
raise questions about the effect of the Federal Rules.
III

ANALYSIS

A.
One of the most interesting aspects of the Iaeonetti case is the
care with which Judge Weinstein distinguished his analysis of the
probative value of Lioi's prior statement from his discussion of the
hearsay issues raised by the proffer of those statements. As a result certain features of his analysis emerge more clearly then they
otherwise might. The probative value of the statements was assessed before their status under the hearsay rule was resolved. At
common law, the considerable discussion of the probative value of
such statements was based upon the assumption that the statements could not be received as substantive evidence.3 4 The probative value to be weighed in such circumstances was the
probative value of the fact of the statement's having been made,
the fact of consistency.3 In strict theory, if the statement may
also be received as proof of the facts asserted in it, the probative
value of the statement as substantive evidence must also be
weighed.
As a practical matter, however, it is doubtful whether much
turns on this distinction. The jury has heard the witness tell his
31. 540 F.2d at 577.

32. Id.

33. Id. In order for Judge Weinstein's theory to fit the case, one first has to re-

solve the issue of credibility in favor of IAoL To put it another way, one has
to decide that Iaconetti is guilty. In this sense the ultimate issue of fact in

the case coincides with the preliminary issue of fact. Either the judge must
decide, on the basis of what he knows, that it is more probable than not that
Lioi's version of the February 10th meeting is correct, see FED. R. EVID.
104(a), or he must admit the statement if a reasonable jury could conclude,
by the appropriate standard, that Lioi's version was correct.
34 See text accompanying notes 3-6 supra.
35. See Gooderson, Previous Consistent Statements, 26 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 64, 79
(1968).
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story from the stand. They will likely believe that statement unless contradictory or impeaching evidence is presented. Without a
reason to disbelieve the statement, the-jury will have little interest
in prior consistent statements regardless of the use that may be
made of them. If the jury is given some reason to disbelieve the
on-stand testimony, it is difficult to imagine cases in which the
statements would be of value as substantive evidence but in which
they would not be of greater value in bolstering the on-stand testimony.
Judge Weinstein's decision to treat the relevancy issue first
may be regarded as implicit recognition that any liberalizing of the
hearsay rule that may be accomplished by the Federal Rules will
probably not affect the evaluation of the evidence under Rules 401
through 403. To the extent, therefore, that the common law cases
may be read as passing only upon the relevancy of the statements,
Rules
the changes wrought in the hearsay law by the Federal
36
would not necessarily render that learning obsolete.
B.
Judge Weinstein, however, neither invoked any pre-Rules precedent nor expressly employed such pre-existing doctrine. His
decision is thus also consistent with the view that the Federal
Rules have liberated the courts from an obligation to adhere to the
results of particular pre-Rules precedents. While it is true that
Rules 401 through 403 incorporate the traditional common law
standards, the Rules do not necessarily endorse any previous application of such standards. A court could, without censure, follow
a pre-Rules precedent on the ground that the earlier court reached
its result by employing the very analysis codified in the Rules; or a
court might regard the Rules as inviting it to re-examine prior
37
The
holdings to see if they in fact square with the standards.
is
opinion
Weinstein's
Judge
omission of any pre-Rules cases from
some evidence that he took the latter approach, but it would be
even more impressive evidence if his analysis departed from the
common law.
In view of the conflicts among the jurisdictions, it is, perhaps, a
misnomer to speak of prior law, but one matter was plain-prior
consistent statements were not admissible to corroborate a witness whose credibility had not been attacked. 38 The logic of this
Compare FED. R EviD. 401-403 with MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 303
(1942).
37. See Travers, An Essay on the Determinationof Relevancy Under the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 1977 ARiz. ST. LJ. 327, 334.
38. 4 J. WiGMoRE, supra note 4, § 1124. It is worth noting this limitation seems to
have been imposed in North Carolina and Maryland, two states that other36.
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view is quite clear. Notwithstanding the fact that any showing of
consistency has some tendency to enhance the credibility of a witness, a witness who has not been impeached does not need to have
his credibility enhanced. The jury will have no interest in the
statements. Presumably this would be true even if the witness
were a party and interested in the outcome. 39 Hence, absent some
impeachment, prior consistent statements would be of insufficient
probative value to be admitted.
Once the credibility of the witness has been attacked, the matter changes. The jury is now interested in evidence that bolsters
the witness' credibility. The issue becomes whether, given the type
of attack, a prior consistent statement has this effect. This was the
issue that split the courts. 4° Some courts-a very few-would admit such statements regardless of the nature of the impeachment.
Other courts found the statements inadequate to blunt certain
types of impeachment, and thus inadmissible. In drawing these
wise were wide open as far as the use of prior consistent statements were
concerned. See Annot., 140 A.L.R. 21, 27-32 (1942), supplemented, Annot., 75
A.L.R.2d 909, 925-27 (1961).
39. Thomas, in discussing Missouri law, notes a particular reluctance on the part
of the Missouri courts to receive corroborating statements by party-witnesses. See Thomas, supra note 5, at 498-500. Wigmore notes a similar reluctance elsewhere. See 4 J. WiGMORE, supra note 4, § 1133. This seems
strange since the obvious interest of a party would seem to be a ground for
disbelief of his testimony even in the absence of impeaching evidence. This
may be a recognition of the danger of canned statements. See text accompanying notes 73-74 infra. It may also, in some jurisdictions, simply be a reflection of the fact that a party's motive to fabricate may arise so early as to make
it difficult to find prior consistent statements uttered before the motive arose.
It should be noted, however, that courts do not always insist that the statements antedate the corrupting evidence. Consider, for example, United
States v. Simmons, 567 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1977), in which it was alleged that
the witness falsely implicated the defendant in order to terminate his own
questioning so he could be taken to a hospital for a drug treatment. Id. at 321.
It appears, however, that the witness would have been laboring under the
same compulsion at the time he made the prior statements offered to corroborate his testimony. Compare the report of United States v. Lanier, 3 FED. R.
Evin. NEws 78-82 (8th Cir. June 7, 1978) (No. 77-1448). The report suggests
that the court often has some discretion in deciding when the motive to falsify arose. Even if the motive may have pre-dated the statement, if subsequent events are likely to have impressed upon the witness the gravity of his
situation, the statements might be received.
40. Thomas points out that the courts did not always recognize that this was a
problem of relevancy. Thomas, supra note 5, at 473-74. One way in which
the hearsay and the relevancy issues overlapped lay in the fear that the witness would "corroborate himself." This fear is evidenced by the notion that
the jury might not appreciate the fact that a prior consistent statement by a
witness, considered as substantive evidence, rested as much on the credibility of the witness as his on-stand testimony, and the jury would therefore
tend to overvalue the evidence. It may be doubted whether juries are really
that dense.
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lines, the courts were often hindered by considerable doctrinal

fuzziness.
C.
If a witness has simply been contradicted by another witness,
obviously the jury will have to resolve the conflict in testimony,
but it is doubtful that evidence of a prior consistent statement by
one of the witnesses will be of much help. A moment's reflection
should suggest to most jurors that the witness must have told the
story at least once before or he would not be on the stand telling
the story now. The presentation of prior consistent statements by
both witnesses would either leave the matter a stand-off, or favor
the witness who, by accident or design, told the most persons his
story.41 In the absence of some other impeaching evidence, a jury
would likely resolve the conflict on the bases of the intrinsic believability of the stories and the witnesses' demeanor. The admission of prior consistent statements would shed little light on either.
Accordingly, most courts rejected the prior consistent statements
42
if no impeachment other than contradiction had been attempted.
4
3
Despite occasional decisions to the contrary, any decision that
the Federal Rules of Evidence authorized the admission of prior
consistent statements upon a showing of conflict in the testimony
would be construing the Rules to dramatically alter pre-existing
doctrine.
Although there is a narrow ground upon which the statements
in laconetti may be found probative," Judge Weinstein appears to
adopt the view that contradiction is enough under the Federal
Rules, finding that the case is so dominated by the issue of the
credibility of Lioi and Iaconetti regarding the February 10th meeting that any evidence bearing on this issue is of value. The road to
this conclusion was smoothed considerably by the Rules' handling
of relevancy issues. The term "relevant" as applied to evidence is
so defined as to make relevant any evidence having any tendency
whatever to make a fact of consequence more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence. In effect, evidence is "relevant" if it has any probative force whatever. 45 This
41. A similar observation is made by Wigmore. See 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4,
§ 1127.
42. E.g., Inman Bros. v. Dudley &Daniels Lumber Co., 146 F. 449 (6th Cir. 1906);
Commonwealth v. Brown, 23 Pa. Super. Ct. 470 (1903).
43. Especially in Maryland and North Carolina. See, e.g., Cooke v. Curtis, 6 H. &
J. 93 (1823); March v. Harrell, 46 N.C. (1 Jones) 329 (1854). Other jurisdictions have also flirted with this idea, but cases to the contrary usually also
exist in these jurisdictions.
44. See § 1II-D infra.
45. FED. R. EvW. 401.

PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS

in turn means that all prior consistent statements are "relevant"
because the fact of consistency itself has some tendency to corroborate the testimony. But this, of course, would be true in the absence of a contradiction-or any other attack on the witness'
credibility.
The very expansive definition of "relevant" evidence means
that a greater burden is placed upon the judge's discretionary
power to exclude under Rule 403.46 Presumably those common law
cases that rejected prior consistent statements did not do so on the
ground that such statements were utterly lacking in probative
value but on the basis that the mere fact of consistency was not of
sufficient worth to warrant cluttering up the trial except in certain
special cases. A like analysis under the Federal Rules would result in the exclusion of the evidence under Rule 403. Nevertheless
Judge Weinstein found no error in admitting the statements and,
again, Rule 403 itself contributed to that result.47 In the first place,

Rule 403 does not appear to authorize exclusion of relevant evidence unless its probative value is "substantially outweighed" by
the listed factors. Moreover, even in such situations, exclusion
seems discretionary though there can be little doubt that the discretion may be abused. Thus Rule 403 is skewed in favor of admissibility.
Moreover, the very listing of the countervailing factors in the
rule enjoins upon the court a somewhat more precise delineation
of the risks of admitting the statements than was required by judicially devised doctrine. Taking these in order, Judge Weinstein
reasoned that the rebuttal testimony could hardly be more inflammatory, i.e., prejudicial, than Lioi's on-stand recitation of his story.
Judge Weinstein couched this portion of his analysis in terms that
suggest the conclusion might have been different if the prior statements had somehow been brought to the jury's attention before
Lioi told his story on the stand, but Judge Weinstein's analysis
would seem applicable in any situation in which the statements
were offered after the witness had testified. Likewise Judge
Weinstein found the other factors-such as confusion of the issues
or waste of time-unimportant because he confined the partner
and attorney to testifying to the statements and only the statements. 48 Again this reasoning would seem available whenever a
prior consistent statement is offered. While Judge Weinstein's
opinion might suggest ways of confining the witness, it offers no
theory for screening out statements on relevancy grounds.
46. FEaD. R. Evw. 403.
47. 406 F. Supp. at 557.
48. Id.
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To be sure, the opinion is dealing with a motion for a new trial.
To the extent that admission of prior consistent statements generally may be thought to involve serious risks of undue time consumption, those risks are more impressive when the judge is
making an initial decision whether to admit than they are when a
decision to admit is under attack on appeal or on a motion for a
new trial. Accordingly, the precedential force of the case may be
greater in such retrospective proceedings although Judge Weinstein seems not to place much weight on the fact that the admission of unduly time-consuming evidence can hardly be a ground
for retrying the whole case.
One reading of the opinion, then, is that under the Federal
Rules prior consistent statements are always "relevant" under
Rule 401 and that, in the usual case, there are no substantial
counterweights that would call for the exclusion of the statements
under Rule 403. Hence, so far as the relevancy calculus is concerned, the statements will customarily be received.4 9 A variation
of this reading admits that waste of time may be a serious problem
that should be considered by the trial court in making its initial
ruling but can hardly be a basis for upsetting what was done either
on appeal or in a motion for a new trial.
D.
Judge Weinstein also seems to offer a narrower ground of decision. If Lioi's version of the February 10th meeting were correct,
one would naturally expect him to consult his attorney and partner. The failure to present evidence of such a consultation might
lead the jury to believe that it did not occur and thus discredit
Lioi's story. Rule 801(d) (1) (B) acknowledges the value of prior
consistent statements in rebutting, inter alia, a charge of recent
fabrication. 50 There appear to have been two types of cases in
which the courts would deem such a charge to have been made. If
the witness was impeached by evidence that he recently obtained
an interest in the case, or developed a bias for or against a party, or
was brought under a party's influence, it might be implied that his
testimony was recently "fabricated" to further the interest, bias, or
influence.5 ' Thus, if it could be shown that the witness began bar49. One exception occurs in the cases in which the witness describes a prior
identification of the defendant from a book of mug shots, thus revealing the
defendant's criminal record. A good discussion of this problem may be
found in Gooderson, supra note 35, at 74-81.
50. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
51. E.g., United States v. Lombardi, 550 F.2d 827 (2d Cir. 1977) (under Federal
Rules); Brown v. State, 262 Ark. 298, 556 S.W.2d 418 (1977) (statute based on
Federal Rules).
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gaining with the government for a reduction in his sentence
shortly before trial, the implication would be that the witness contrived his testimony to fulfill his part of the deal. 52 Or if it could be

shown that the witness was in need of drug treatment and was
taken for treatment after giving a statement implicating the dewould again be that the story was
fendant, the implication
53
fabricated to order.
Such cases could also be described as cases in which the impeaching party also charged improper influence or motive. Indeed, Wigmore argued that such cases should, in the interest of
clarity, not be called cases of recent fabrication. This term he
would confine to another group of cases. 54 If it could be shown
that a witness discussed the subject matter of his testimony on
some previous occasion and omitted to mention certain facts to
which he later testified, and it would have been natural to mention
the facts at the earlier time, it was possible to account for the discrepancy by hypothesizing that facts omitted earlier were invented
for trial. The use of prior consistent statements to rebut this hypothesis was widely recognized.
Had evidence been offered in laconetti that Lioi had not even
mentioned laconetti's solicitation of a bribe on or around February
10th, then it would have been fairly orthodox to receive evidence of
prior statements to rebut the inference of recent fabrication. Such
rebuttal testimony might relate to the occasions on which Lioi was
alleged to have been silent-thus attacking directly the claim of
silence-or to other, roughly contemporaneous occasions-thus attacking the inference of recent fabrication.
The problem is that in Iaconetti, so far as the opinion reveals,
defense counsel had not introduced such evidence or in any other
way suggested that Lioi's testimony had been recently fabricated
at the time that the statements were offered in rebuttal. However,
there is support for allowing such a charge, which might, for example, be suggested in summation, to be anticipated if the impeaching inference is one that the jury is likely to draw even in the
absence of evidence supporting it.55 It might, therefore, seem that
a court that was of a mind to limit Iaconetti could stress this view
of the case: the statements did not pass muster under Rules 401
52. United States v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109 (8th Cir. 1977).
53. United States v. Simmons, 567 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1977).
54. Wigmore actually preferred the phrase "recent contrivance" to the more common "recent fabrication," but nothing substantive seems to turn on the
choice of words. See 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1129.
55. For example, such an inference was once thought natural if the prosecutrix in
a rape case did not make a contemporaneous complaint. For an argument
that counsel should be permitted generally to anticipate the impeachment,
see Gooderson, supra note 35, at 86-89.

988

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 57, NO. 4 (1978)

and 403 because those Rules would pass any prior consistent statement, even by an unimpeached witness; rather, the statements in
Iaconetti were of special value because an impeaching inference
would likely have been drawn by the jury upon any suggestion by
defense counsel and, hence, a need to counter such an inference
was present.
While this latter view would provide an alternative reading of
laconetti, it is doubtful that it would really be a narrower one. It
-is true that the jury might have doubted Lioi's story had it heard
that he said nothing about the bribe when it allegedly happened,
but it is not certain that there is anything special about the situation in laconetti that would peculiarly incline a jury to infer that
Lioi had been silent and then to make the further impeaching inference of recent fabrication. There is thus nothing special that
would call for anticipating impeachment. If this is correct, then
this reading of the opinion provides a theory of relevancy that is
almost as expansive as the previous reading.
E.
Judge Weinstein's treatment of the hearsay issue is at least
equally far-reaching. Rule 801(d) (1) (B) admits prior consistent
statements as substantive evidence when offered to rebut a charge
of "recent fabrication" or "improper influence or motive." The Advisory Committee's Note indicates that the rule allows their use as
substantive evidence only if those statements would have been admissible under the prior law to rebut the charges.5 6 It may be argued, therefore, that in construing this rule the logic if not the
precedents of the pre-Rules law must be honored.
As was true in the portion of the opinion dealing with the relevancy of the statements, Judge Weinstein did not employ any earlier cases in construing Rule 801(d) (1) (B), but this should no
longer be surprising. The notion that Lioi's earlier statements
might be introduced to rebut an anticipated charge of recent
fabrication, 5 7 although not tied to Rule 801(d) (1) (B), suggests a
willingness to employ concepts in an innovative fashion. It might,
in fact, have been possible to bring the statements under Rule
801(d) (1) (B) had this analysis been pushed a bit further; the fact
that it was not may be further evidence that Judge Weinstein
wanted to establish an even broader theory of relevancy under the
Rules.
In any event, Judge Weinstein's conclusion that the conflict between Iaconetti and Lioi was enough to imply a charge that Lioi
56. FED. R. Evm. 801(d) (1) (B), Adv. Comm. Note.
57. See § E11-D supra.
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was improperly motivated goes beyond the bulk of the prior decisions and the logic behind the pre-Rules law. The question is
whether such a conclusion is improper because it expands the rule
beyond the scope intended by the drafters or whether Rule
801(d) (1) (B) might not invite such an expansive approach.
Rule 801(d) (1) (B) may be intended to serve either or both of
two purposes. The most widely recognized situations permitting
the use of prior consistent statements under the pre-Rules case
law were those in which it was suggested that the witness was
under improper influence or was improperly motivated and those
involving the suggestion that the trial testimony was a recent
fabrication, 5 8 but, of course, the statement was not admissible as
substantive evidence. Presumably the party opposing the introduction of the statement would be entitled to have the jury instructed as to the use it might make of the statement.5 9 An
instruction similar to that criticized in the California Evidence
Code should suffice: "Ladies and gentlemen, you are not entitled
to consider the statement as proof of the facts stated in it, or to
inquire whether the witness spoke the truth on that occasion, but
you may consider the statement for whatever light it sheds on the
question whether the witness is telling the truth when he asserts
the same facts on the stand." 60 Absent Rule 801(d) (1) (B), a similar instruction would have to be given under the Federal Rules as
well. It is really doubtful that such an instruction could be productive of anything other than jury confusion. The drafters might
well have felt that the statements were going to come in anyway,
and that it would be a blessing for all concerned if such an instruction could be dispensed with. To the extent that this was the purpose of Rule 801(d) (1) (B), to the extent that the rule is a study in
resignation, perhaps it should be given a grudging construction.
There is, however, another view. The Advisory Committee's
Note also states, "The prior statement is consistent with the testimonr given on the stand, and, if the opposite party wishes to open
the door for its admission in evidence, no sound reason is apparent
why it should not be received generally." 61 If one ignores for the
moment the language about "opening the door," the most natural
reading of this sentence is that there is no valid hearsay objection
to receiving prior consistent statements as substantive evidence,
58. See text accompanying notes 50-53 supra.

59. Leading cases include Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 76 Mass. (10 Gray) 485
(1858); People v. Jung Hing, 212 N.Y. 393, 106 N.E. 105 (1914).
60. CAL Evm. CODE § 1236, Comment-Law Revision Comm'n (West 1966): "It is
not realistic to expect a jury to understand that it cannot believe that a witness was telling the truth on a former occasion even though it believes that
the same story given at the hearing is true."
61. FED. R.EviD. 801(d) (1) (B), Adv. Comm. Note.
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at least when offered for the purposes specified in Rule
801(d) (1) (B). This, in turn, raises the question whether Rule
801(d) (1) (B) could be thought to define a class of prior consistent
statements in which on-stand cross examination was particularly
useful in protecting against hearsay risks. If there is nothing special about these statements, the judgment that no valid hearsay
objection to them exists could be used to support the receipt of any
prior consistent statements as substantive evidence.
F.
When Professor Morgan and his associates were drafting the
Model Code they concluded that there was no valid hearsay objection to receiving any prior statements by a witness who was "present and subject to cross examination." 62 In justifying this
conclusion in his Foreword to the Model Code, Morgan identified
three possible reasons for preferring on-stand testimony to declarations made at a time nearer the events described and under circumstances less artificial than those of a courtroom: (1) the earlier
statement was not made under oath; (2) the earlier statement was
not subject to cross examination at the time it was made; and (3)
the jury could not observe the demeanor of the declarant at the
time the statement was made. None of these reasons could adequately rationalize the hearsay rule and its exceptions, which Morgan regarded as a hopeless tangle of inconsistencies and
63
conflicting assumptions.
Of the three, only the objective of providing the party against
whom the statement was offered the opportunity to test the declarant by cross examination seemed to have much force. So far as
the oath was concerned, only one hearsay exception required that
the out-of-court declaration be made under oath.64 Not only did
other exceptions countenance the admission of unsworn statements, but out-of-court statements given under oath would not become admissible thereby. Moreover, "unfortunate as it may be, it
is now generally recognized that the oath has lost most of its efficacy as a sanction. ' 65 Morgan doubted the value of demeanor evidence per se.66 Demeanor while undergoing cross examination
62. Morgan, Foreword to MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, 36, 49 (1942).
63. Id. Morgan remained unreconstructed, even after the failure of the Model
Code. He made a similar demonstration of the grotesqueries of the hearsay
rule in E. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE AINGLO-AMERICAN
SYSTEM OF LITIGATION 169-95 (1956).
64. The exception for reported testimony.
Note.
65. Morgan, supra note 62, at 36-37.

66. Id.

See FED. R. Evm. 801(d), Adv. Comm.
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could be considered an aspect of the goal of providing an opportunity to cross examine.
If the use of the out-of-court statement required one to treat the
declarant as a witness, Morgan had no doubt that a well conducted
cross examination could be helpful to the jury, but he tended to be
skeptical of some of the exaggerated claims made for it. Morgan
noted that there were few documented instances of cross examination unmasking deliberate perjury; instead, its chief value seemed
to be that it "frequently disclose[d] imperfections as to observation and memory" 67 in testimony given by essentially honest witnesses. The cross examiner would reveal slips in memory or
defects in perceptive ability that might weaken the force of the witness' testimony. Furthermore, the way in which the witness used
language could be tested to reveal possibly misleading articulations. Of course, if the opponent declined to object to hearsay
when offered, the jury was entitled to use it for whatever value it
that jurors could apmight have, presumably on the assumption
68
preciate the dangers in using hearsay.
If the declarant were present and subject to cross examination,
Morgan believed that no hearsay objection to the receipt of his
prior statements was valid. 69 The witness could be interrogated
about the statement and, by hypothesis, had testified as to the
facts asserted in it. If the prior statement were inconsistent with
his testimony, he could be forced to take a position about the statement and be questioned with the jury observing his demeanor. If
the statement were consistent with his on-stand testimony, the
witness would have, in effect, adopted the earlier statement under
oath. Cross examination would necessarily attack the statement,
and again the witness' demeanor could be observed.
In recent years this analysis, as applied to prior inconsistent
statements of a witness, has come under attack, but some of the
most articulate critics of the use of prior inconsistent statements
as substantive evidence do not apply their strictures to prior consistent statements.7 0 There are, however, some arguments against
the use of such statements that need examining.
G.
First, there is the oft-quoted remark that subsequent cross examination is not a substitute for contemporaneous cross examina67. Id. at 37.
68. A leading general
Hearsay,46 IowA L
69. Morgan, supra note
70. E.g., R. LEmP RT &

(1977).

discussion of this is Weinstein, Probative Force of
REv. 331 (1961).
62, at 36-50.
S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 480
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tion because "[f]alse testimony is apt to harden and become
unyielding to the blows of truth in proportion as the witness has
opportunity for reconsideration and influence by the suggestions
of others, whose interest may be, and often is, to maintain falsehood rather than truth. ' 7 1 If the earlier statement is inconsistent
with the witness' trial testimony, it is possible to turn the metaphor around and point out that the earlier statement has softened
like an asphalt road in August. 72 When the trial testimony is consistent with the earlier statement, there has been no such "softening." But if the earlier statement was false and has "hardened,"
this would mean that the on-stand testimony has become impervious to cross examination. In other words, if a person tells a false
story and is subject to immediate cross examination, it may be a
good bit easier to get him or her to change the story than it would
be if the cross examination is deferred. To the extent that this is
so, it is an argument that casts doubt on almost all on-stand cross
examination since, by hypothesis, it will have been deferred. But
the whole hearsay rule rests upon the notion that on-stand cross
examination is of great value, and there is thus an internal contradiction in justifying use of the hearsay rule to exclude prior statements with such a theory.
There is, however, a more serious objection. Admitting all
prior statements by a witness as substantive evidence might encourage a lawyer to have canned statements prepared-preferably
in written form-by each witness he or she intends to call. Professor Dow put this objection about as well as possible:
If any prior statement of a witness is to be regularly admitted, the pressure to secure such statements, which is now substantial, will inevitably
be increased. The trial will certainly tend to be cluttered with prior statement after prior statement, written and oral, drawn not with a view to preserving the memory of the witness or the lawyer but with a view to making
the best
case before the jury or to presenting the jury with a written
73
brief.

This fear is entitled to respect, and we may all agree that the scenario that Professor Dow envisages is not an attractive prospect.
But if admission is limited to statements of a witness who has
been successfully impeached and the impeachment has also
sapped the force of the earlier statement, the pressure may not be
as great. Such a practice might, in the words of Professor
Maguire, be made to "recoil dreadfully upon the litigant whose
lawyers had carried out the practice." 74
71. State v. Saporen, 205 Minn. 358, 362, 285 N.W. 898, 901 (1939).
72. E.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 159 (1970) (White, J.).
73. Dow, supra note 1, at 607.
74. J. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE: COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAw 63 (1947).
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It would certainly appear to be true that certain assaults upon
the witness' credibility would successfully undermine any prior
consistent statements the witness may have made. For example,
if the cross examination raised serious doubts about whether the
witness really perceived the event described-as by showing that
the witness was quite nearsighted and, perhaps, not wearing
glasses-those doubts would also attach to prior statements, even
ones made soon after the event. Likewise, if it could be shown
that the witness' use of words created a misleading impression as
to the nature of the testimony, a similarly worded prior statement
would also be clarified.75 In these situations, the prior consistent
statements being of no rehabilitative use, there would be less pressure to secure canned statements. If offered, they might not even
be admitted although the broad view of the relevancy of such
statements espoused in laconetti would require exclusion of fewer
statements on that ground.76 In any case, the opportunity for
cross examination called for by the hearsay rules seems to have
been afforded.
Conversely, there are lines of impeachment that may weaken
the impact of a witness' testimony but that do not have a like effect
upon prior consistent statements. For example, if it could be
shown that a prosecution witness was in custody on another
charge, the jury might have doubts about the witness' sincerity. A
consistent statement made prior to the witness' arrest would not
be subject to the same doubts, and as Rule 801(d) (1) (B) recognizes, these were the very situations in which evidence that the
statement had been made would usually be received. Hence,
pressure to obtain such statements must already exist in those
cases. 77 So far as the hearsay risks are concerned, the hearsay
rule is not a rule that guarantees the cross examiner maximum
destructive impact, but one that affords the opportunity to test the
witness. If, in availing him or herself of that opportunity, counsel
selects a line of attack that does not have much impact upon the
75. Morgan's favorite example of the witness who used words in a misleading
manner was drawn from the two ballistic6 experts who testified against
Sacco and Vanzetti He used this illustration on several occasions, but perhaps his most interesting treatment is to be found in his portion of L. JOUGHIN
&E. MORGAN, THE LEGACY OF SACCO AND VANZETTn 85-90 (1948).

76. This statement needs some qualification. Some courts are willing to admit
statements made after the witness had an incentive to fabricate and, one
would think, any loss of confidence in the witness would attach to these

statements as well. See Note, 45 CALw. L REV. 202 (1957).
77. The leading case of People v. Singer, 300 N.Y. 120, 89 N.E.2d 710 (1949), involved such a situation. For a post-Rules case, see United States v. McGrath,
558 F.2d 1102 (2d Cir. 1977), in which the pressure was a perjury indictment
brought against the witness because of earlier inconsistent statements under

oath.
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witness' earlier statements, perhaps the impeaching data is not all
that important.
There may be special problems with written statements that
should be dealt with by the court. It is possible to admit the statement but not permit the writing to go to the jury. Such a solution
was, in fact, codified so far as statements received under the recorded recollection exception were concerned, 78 largely in response to the fear that witnesses, if counseled early enough, would
provide written statements for the jury and then claim some impairment of memory. Surely the courts retain discretion to impose similar limitations in analogous circumstances when the
same risk is posed.
H.
If this analysis is correct, it appears that subsequent cross examination is adequate regarding any prior consistent statement,
for whatever purpose it may be offered. There is nothing about
prior consistent statements offered for the two rebuttal purposes
mentioned in Rule 801(d) (1) (B) that make them uniquely susceptible of being probed by later cross examination. It is a fair reading of the Advisory Committee's Note that the drafters of the Rules
accepted this view for statements offered for the specified pur'7 9
poses of "recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.
The limitations of Rule 801(d) (1) (B) do not, however, delineate a
class of prior consistent statements that is different from other
similar statements in any respect that is meaningful so far as the
hearsay rule is concerned. One response may be to give Rule
801(d) (1) (B) the broadest possible reading even if this means cutting loose from the cases antedating the Rules. To the extent that
Judge Weinstein's opinion embodies this response, his innovative
construction of the rule may be entirely justifiable.
There is, however, one qualification to this conclusion. It seems
that the opposite party's "opening the door" was felt by the drafters to be a prerequisite to the admissibility of these statements.
The argument could be made that only in such circumstances did
the drafters conclude that "no sound reason is apparent" why the
statements should not be received as substantive evidence. If
some volitional act by the opponent was intended to be a prerequisite, the opponent ought to be aware of engaging in that act. To
the extent that Rule 801(d) (1) (B) is construed as admitting as
substantive evidence only those prior consistent statements that
had theretofore been received to rebut charges of recent
78. FED. R. EvmD. 803(5).

79.

FED.

R EviD. 801(d) (1) (B), Adv. Comm. Note.
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fabrication or improper motive or influence, 80 the opponent could
know in advance whether he was "opening the door." It might,
therefore, be argued that the construction of the rule in laconetti
is not properly sensitive to this qualification upon the drafters'
conclusion about the absence of hearsay dangers.
It exaggerates the clarity of the pre-Rules law to so conclude,
however. There was considerable vagueness in the cases as to
when such a charge would be implied and what prior consistent
statements were made admissible thereby. It cannot really be
contended that there was anything like a uniform federal rule on
the matter.81 Thus, while it is true that a construction of the Rules
that adopted an innovative approach as to when statements would
be admissible might, on occasion, mean that an opponent was
somewhat surprised by the consequences of a line of attack on a
witness, freezing the terms with reference to the law as it existed
on the date of adoption of the Federal Rules would not eliminate
such surprises and would run counter 82
to the general, evolutionary
objectives of the Rules in the bargain.
Moreover, this notion of "opening the door" does not appear to
be meaningful so far as the policies of the hearsay rule are concerned. It is not the "opening of the door" that makes the opportunity for cross examination of the witness adequate to eliminate the
hearsay risks of admitting the prior consistent statements. It
would seem, therefore, that this language does not qualify the conclusion that Rule 801(d) (1) (B) embodies the belief that there is no
valid hearsay objection to the use of such statements.
I.
There is a further reason why Judge Weinstein's somewhat cavalier treatment of prior learning may be appropriate. There were
two types of cases in which the charge of recent fabrication was
thought to be implied: the cases in which the impeaching party
produces evidence of bias, interest, or pressure operating upon the
witness; and the cases in which the witness made a prior statement that was silent in material respects, or in which the witness
was entirely silent under circumstances that should have induced
a statement.83 The reference in Rule 801(d) (1) (B) to "recent
80. See § flI-D of text supra.

81. Compare, e.g., Coltrane v. United States, 418 F.2d 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (hostile to the receipt of such statements) and Dowdy v. United States, 46 F.2d
417 (4th Cir. 1931) (refusing to follow the wide open North Carolina rule)
with United States v. Zito, 467 F.2d 1401 (2d Cir. 1972) and Hanger v. United
States, 398 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1968).
82. See FED. &. Evm. 102.
83. See § HI-D of text supra.
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fabrication" must encompass both lines of cases, or the words
would add nothing to the reference to improper influence or motive.
The difficulty begins when one considers the cases in which the
witness is impeached by the use of a prior inconsistent statement.
The courts were divided about the subsequent use of a prior consistent statement to rehabilitate in such cases. Some courts did
allow the statements on the not-too-satisfactory ground that consistent statements should be allowed on the witness' behalf just as
inconsistent statements may be used to impeach.8 4 Other courts
pushed the analysis a bit further. If it was admitted that the inconsistent statement had been made, 85 the witness was impeached
by the fact of the inconsistency, by the fact of having "blown hot
and cold" on the issue.8 6 A showing that the witness had told a
inconsistent story on yet a third occasion did not eliminate the
87
consistency and thus did not rebut the impeaching evidence.
The same argument can be made about the witness' silence on
an earlier occasion. It may be true that the failure to relate certain
facts earlier might be deemed an attempt to deprive the other side
of an opportunity to investigate the story. This might especially
seem to be the case if a witness fails to tell the police certain
facts. 8 8 Yet telling a story at variance with the witness' trial testimony would seem no less a concealment of the facts now told but
not then revealed, except to the extent that telling an inconsistent
story may mean supplying a story that can be checked while silence produces only a void.
It is true that the failure to mention facts at an earlier date does
not impeach in quite the same manner as a prior inconsistent
statement. If the witness has told discrepant stories, it is possible
to place the two stories side by side and note that they cannot both
be true. Of course, both stories can be true if facts are omitted so
long as related facts conform. But the notion that the silence is
sufficient to give rise to an inference of recent fabrication (since
the facts would naturally have been mentioned if true), carries
with it the idea that the silence is tantamount to a denial of those
84. E.g., Coates v. People, 106 Colo. 483, 106 P.2d 354 (1940).
85. As noted in note 16 supra, several jurisdictions followed the "Michigan Rule"
and admitted prior consistent statements if the making of the inconsistent
statement was a disputed issue.
86.

C. McCoRnICK, EVIDENCE 68 (2d ed. 1972).

87. E.g., Riney v. Vanlandingham, 9 Mo. 475, 477 (1846).
88. See the discussion in Gooderson, supra note 35, at 66-70, of an apparent recognition by Commonwealth courts of a rule that permits a defendant to offer
a self-serving declaration made to the police. In many instances it may be
said that the willingness of the defendant to tell the police a story and thus
give them the opportunity to check it shows that nothing has been concealed.
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facts. So construed, the silence seems virtually indistinguishable
from a prior inconsistent statement. 89
Should Rule 801(d) (1) (B) be read as authorizing the use of
prior consistent statements when the witness has been impeached
by a prior inconsistent statement? A "no" answer would mean
that the courts were fettered by a distinction in the cases that has
little to commend it. A 'yes" answer would mean one of two
things: Either the courts are free to depart from the strict letter of
the earlier holdings when the policy of the rule calls for it; or the
courts could admit the consistent statements, invoking the preRules precedents that did so. The difficulty with the latter solution is that those decisions seem not to have conceptualized the
admission of the statements as within the "recent fabrication" theory. The choice appears to be between rejecting statements that
are admissible under the basic policy of Rule 801(d) (1) (B), and
analytically the same as other statements received under the "recent fabrication" theory; or admitting such statements by giving
the rule a construction that departs from the strict pre-Rules law.
The conclusion to which all of this points is that Rule
801(d) (1) (B) should be regarded as eliminating the hearsay objection to any prior consistent statements of a witness, and Judge
Weinstein's apparent view that a sharp conflict in testimony opens
the door to prior consistent statements by both witnesses goes far
toward that conclusion. Not only does it push the notion of "rebuttal" beyond its common law limits but it finds a charge of improper
motive in a situation in which it is unlikely that common law doctrine would have supported it.
There is, however, a possible objection to this conclusion that
deserves a word. It may be contended that the facts in laconetti
present a special case in that the defense theory of the case is that
Lioi was lying to cover up his own attempt at bribing a government
inspector. This being so, it might be thought that a charge of "improper motive" is more readily found in this case than in many
other situations in which a prior consistent statement might be offered. If, for example, Iaconetti had persisted in his original story
that he was joking, would there have been such an implied charge?
In fact, this limited reading of the case poses problems of its
own. The notion of an implied charge of "improper motive" has to
be defined in light of its place in a rule admitting prior consistent
statements to rebut the charge. If the "improper motive" is Lioi's
desire to cover up, surely that motive was present when he made
the statements to his partner and attorney. The" statements would
89. Wigmore seems to take the same view. See 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, §
1129.
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hardly blunt that sort of charge. It would seem, then, that this
reading of the case does not place satisfactory limits on its holding.
Even under this view, the decision gives new meaning to the language of Rule 801(d) (1) (B).
J.
It needs now to be considered whether Judge Weinstein's construction of Rule 803(24) does not provide an alternative theory to
the admissibility of these statements that is preferable. Since the
preceding analysis suggests that the use of Rule 801(d) (1) (B), although supported by the judgment behind that rule, does involve
giving the language a new meaning, it might be best to give Rule
801(d) (1) (B) a more traditional reading and use Rule 803(24) to
admit statements like those in laconetti.
Use of Rule 803(24) requires both that the standards for admissibility be met and that the notice requirement in that rule, which
was carefully added by Congress, be satisfied. So far as the standards are concerned, there might appear to be no difficulty. The
rule requires "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" plus a judicial determination that
(A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point ...than any other evidence which
the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the genof justice will best be served
eral purposes of these rules and the interests 90
by admission of the statement into evidence.

Taking these in order, it has already been explained that Rule
801(d) (1) (B) does not describe a class of prior consistent statements for which the on-stand opportunity is uniquely effective in
eliminating the hearsay dangers. Assuming that Rule
801(d) (1) (B)'s terms are given a traditional meaning, that rule will
not exempt from the hearsay ban many prior consistent statements for which the opportunity to test the declarant on the stand
is just as effective. Hence, it might be contended that the guarantees of trustworthiness provided by such an opportunity are
"equivalent" to those provided when the statements are within
Rule 801(d) (1) (B).
It is true that the rule as proposed required only "comparable"
guarantees, and that Congress changed the word to "equivalent" 91
at the same time that it added the other standards and the notice
requirement. 92 Although linguistically "equivalent" seems a
90. FED. R. Evm. 803(24). See text accompanying notes 27-29 supra.
91. 56 F.R.D. 183, 303 (1973).
92. The Supreme Court Draft of FED. R. EvID.803(24) was wholly deleted by the
House Judiciary Committee. See H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6
(1973), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS 7079. The Senate
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tougher standard than "comparable," as a practical matter there
are few decisions that would have been affected had Congressional
amending ended there. Under either word, Judge Weinstein's
analysis in laconetti seems apt. Even if the statements are not
made admissible under Rule 801(d) (1) (B), Lioi is available for
cross examination and the statements were made early enough to
minimize the risks of faulty memory and insincerity. To the extent that the availability of the declarant as a witness is an adequate guarantee of trustworthiness for purposes of Rule
801(d) (1) (B), the same availability would likely be "comparable"
or "equivalent" when a prior consistent statement not covered by
Rule 801(d) (1) (B) was offered under Rule 803(24).
There is a technical objection to this analysis. The reference is
to "circumstantial" guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent (or,
earlier, comparable) to those of the "foregoing exceptions," but insofar as statements are admitted by virtue of their being prior consistent statements of a witness, it is because such statements are
excluded from the definition of "hearsay" and not because they
fall within one of Rule 803's exceptions to the hearsay rule. The
decision to treat a class of statements by a limitation on the definition and not by an exception was surely not wholly arbitrary. Admissions of a party opponent, traditionally considered an
exception to the hearsay rule, are likewise treated by a limitation
on the definition, and this choice seems to have been largely motiof trustworthivated by the fact that there was "[n]o guarantee
93
ness... required in the case of an admission."
By the same token, prior statements of witnesses have not been
treated as an exception because, unlike the exceptions, the guarantee of trustworthiness lies in the opportunity to cross examine
the declarant in court and not in the circumstances of the statement's making. No circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness
need be shown for prior statements of a witness under Rule
801(d) (1) (A), (B), or (C). It might, therefore, be argued that Rule
803(24) only refers to statements (even prior consistent statements by witnesses) made under circumstances that guarantee
their trustworthiness. Judge Weinstein's reference to the fact that
Lioi's statements were made very soon after his February 10th
meeting with Iaconetti 94 may amount to a search for such circumJudiciary Committee reinstated the provision, see S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 18-20, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7065-66, and
added all the present qualifications except the notice requirement, which the
Conference Committee inserted, presumably as a compromise measure. See
H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12, reprintedin [1974] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7105.
93. FED. R. EvD. 801(d) (2), Adv. Comm. Note.
94. 406 F. Supp. at 599.
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stantial guarantees.
If this line of reasoning is adopted, then it is not every prior
consistent statement that can be admitted under Rule 803(24).
One ignores the statement's being made by a declarant who can
now be cross examined, and looks for things such as the declarant's having labored under the impact of a startling event or the
statement's having been against the declarant's interest when
made. In some cases these circumstantial guarantees will be
found; in others, they will not. Therefore, if this construction of
Rule 803 (24) is adopted, some pressure to give Rule 801(d) (1) (B) a
broad construction not supported by tradition will remain. If this
objection to a broad construction of Rule 803(24) is well-founded,
the choice becomes a choice of rules to construe in a fashion that
seems to play fast and loose with their language: Rule
801(d) (1) (B) or Rule 803(24).
Recognizing the objections to an expansive reading of the
"guarantees" standard can produce bizarre results. Even if one
heeds the warning of Professors Lempert and Saltzburg that several of the exceptions in Rules 803 and 804 are there for purely historical reasons and that "courts should not use exceptions of such
questionable reliability as their benchmark for determining what
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness are equivalent to established exceptions,"9 5 the quality of the guarantee provided by
these exceptions varies widely and none of them seems to provide
guarantees as good as those provided by the cross examination of
the declarant under Rule 801(d) (1) (B). 9 6 If, therefore, this were
the only obstacle to using Rule 803(24) for all prior consistent
statements by a witness, it might be removed.
Congress, of course, added other hurdles to getting statements
past Rule 803(24), fearing that otherwise the exception could swallow the hearsay rule, but apart from the requirement that notice
be given of an intent to use the exception, the requirements do not
seem terribly onerous. Judge Weinstein's construction of the requirement that the statement be offered as evidence of a material
fact saves the phrase from absurdity, but does not convert it into a
meaningful screen. 97 As a pure matter of relevancy the fact must
be of sufficient importance to warrant the statement's being re95. R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 70, at 477.

96. It is not wholly clear which exceptions Professors Lempert and Saltzburg
would exclude as benchmarks, but consider the quality of the guarantees afforded by spontaneous utterances or declarations of mental state. Perhaps
the best guarantees are afforded by recorded recollection, but only because
cross examination of the declarant may be possible since the declarant is
necessary to lay the proper foundation.
97. If the word "material" were given the more common meaning that the fact
must be provable in the action, it would add nothing to FED. Mt Evm. 401, but

PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS

1001

ceived, and it is hard to go much beyond that. Likewise, the requirement that the statement be more probative than any other
evidence that may be procured through reasonable efforts is an element of the relevancy evaluation. 98 If counsel can with reasonable efforts produce more potent stuff, he is likely to do so.
Finally, it is difficult to imagine very many cases in which a judge
otherwise satisfied that the evidence should be admitted would decide that the interests of justice would not be served thereby.
K.
The requirement of pretrial notice in Rule 803(24) coupled with
the objection discussed above, may seem to limit the utility of Rule
803(24) in resolving the problems discussed earlier in connection
with Rule 801(d) (1) (B). That rule could be given a narrow construction, one tracking closely the pre-Rules law, but Rule 803(24)
would be available for receiving any other prior consistent statements that were relevant. Yet the notice requirement may make it
impossible to introduce the statements in any case in which it has
not been complied with. Accordingly, Judge Weinstein's handling
of the problems posed by the lack of notice is significant. It was
this portion of his opinion that received the endorsement of the
second circuit, 99 and in a subsequent case the fifth circuit approved the admission of a prior inconsistent statement that did not
meet Rule 801(d) (1) (A)'s requirements under Rule 803(24), without even mentioning the notice requirement. 0 0
Two conceivable purposes underlie this provision. First, the opponent may be given an opportunity to locate and produce the declarant himself. Second, the opponent will be better able to
prepare to meet the out-of-court declaration. When the declaration was by a person who is a witness at trial, the first purpose
seems largely satisfied. To the extent that there remains the objective of giving the opponent an adequate opportunity to prepare,
even under Judge Weinstein's construction it is doubtful that it would exclude much.
98. See FED. R. EviD. 403, Adv. Comm. Note, which provides:
In reaching a decision whether to exclude on grounds of unfair
prejudice, consideration should be given to the probable effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of a limiting instruction. See Rule
106[105] and Advisory Committee's Note thereunder. The availability of other means of proof may also be an appropriate factor.
99. 540 F.2d at 578.
100. United States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1978). The Williams case also
carries forward a pre-Rules holding that a prior consistent statement may be
admitted even though it was made after the alleged motive to fabricate arose.
Such cases are inconsistent with a construction of Rule 801(d) (1) (B) that
would limit it to statements that are probative in rebutting the charges made.
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it would seem that any preparation made to deal with the declarant as witness should suffice to prepare to meet the consistent
statement as well. 1° 1
Although it should not be concluded that the notice requirement in Rule 803(24) is a dead letter, it does look very much as
though it may not be as serious an obstacle to the admission of
prior consistent statements of a witness as might first appear unless counsel opposing the statement can make a convincing showing of surprise, or the judge believes that the proponent of the
statement was deliberately playing games with the court and opposing counsel. With the notice requirement being given such a
reduced role, Rule 803(24) would seem readily available in theory
for admitting the statements.
IV. CONCLUSION
The above analysis may appear to be an unbridled extrapolation from a single case, and, in a sense, it is. Of course, Judge
Weinstein, as a drafter of the Federal Rules and one of the leading
authorities on them by virtue of his treatise, is not the usual District Judge, and with the second circuit and fifth circuit concurring,
at least in part, such an extrapolation may not be as hazardous as
it usually is. Not only is it possible to demonstrate good reasons
for Judge Weinstein's innovative approach, but the Rules themselves invite that approach. The articulation of general principles
intended to guide the evaluation of the probative worth of a piece
of evidence invites a new inquiry into the worth of prior consistent
statements as well as the risks involved in admitting them. The
evident decision that at least some prior consistent statements do
not pose any serious hearsay dangers invites an inquiry into
whether any prior consistent statements pose those dangers. The
imprecision of the judicial doctrine alluded to in Rule 801 (d) (1) (B)
invites the use of manipulation to achieve more fundamental
objectives, and Rule 803(24), despite congressional amendments,
invites courts to use it when prior consistent statements are offered. Whether the approach of Judge Weinstein in the Iaconetti
case will gain unanimous backing only time can tell.

101. In laconetti, for example, counsel did not claim any inability to defend
against the statements, and it is hard to imagine that he would have tried the
case much differently if he had received earlier notice. In many instances, of
course, opposing counsel will be fully aware of the prior statements. Where
discovery devices permit interrogation of the witness, it can be the easiest
step to ask, routinely, if the witness mentioned his story to others.

